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RECENT DECISIONS

he had no want of understanding at the time of his marriage."
Most authorities 10 agree that an idiot is incapable of any understanding from the time of birth. Thus it would necessarily follow
thatlan annulment could be had under Section 7 of the Domestic
Relations Law, where one of the parties to the marriage is an idiot.
In the De Nardo case, Justice Thacher in his opinion, made the following statement, "Under this section" a marriage may be annulled
because either party is incapable of consenting to a marriage for
want of understanding, and such unsoundness of mind includes both
hmacy and idiocy." Therefore all that is necessary in an action commenced under Section 7 of the Domestic Relations Law and Section
1136 of the Civil Practice Act 12 to annul a marriage because of the
idiocy of one of the parties would be to establish said idiocy by
testimony.
L.L.

MASTER AND SERVANT-FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AcT
-DUTY

OF EMPLOYER TO PROVIDE MEDICAL SERVICE TO INJURED

EmPLOYEE.-Plaintiff-appellant invoked the Federal Employers' Liability Act,1 seeking to recover damages for the negligent death of
her husband. The deceased was a laborer employed by the defendant. In the course of his work he was rendered helpless from heat
prostration. While in such condition he was not afforded any medical
attention by his employer, but the foreman of his crew directed two
of his men to convey him to his home where he was left unaided
and unattended. Death ensued, which, it was claimed, resulted from
10 Bicknell v. Spear, 38 Misc. 389, 391 (1902) ; 1 B- Comm. 302-304, cited
stpra note 6.
11 Dom. RE. LAW § 7, cited supra note 1.
12 CIV. PRAc. AcT § 1136: Action to annul marriage where party was an
idiot. An action to annul a marriage on the ground that one of the parties
thereto was an idiot may be maintained at any time during the life time of
either party by any relative of idiot who has an interest to avoid the marriage.
145 U. S. C. A. §51 (1940) provides that "Every common carrier by
railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or
Territories, or between any of the States and Territories, or between the
District of Columbia and any of the States or Territories, or between the
District of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any foreign nation
or nations, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he
is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of death of such
employee, to his or her porsonal representative, for the benefit of the surviving
widow or husband and children of such employee; . . . for such injury or

death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency,
due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machines, tracks, roadbed,
works, boats, wharves, or other equipment."
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the failure to supply adequate medical care promptly. Plaintiff sought.
to impose liability on two counts. The gravaman of the first cause
was the breach of the defendant's duty to provide medical care and
assistance consonant with the decedent's condition, since he was
powerless to provide for himself. The second count asserted the
failure of the defendant to discharge its duty in a careful and prudent manner, after having undertaken to care for the decedent. Defendant, in seeking to avoid liability, maintained that it owed its
employee no legal duty to provide any attention, and that whatever
action was taken along those lines by its other employees, co-workers
of the decedent, was not within the scope of their employment and
not binding upon it. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed by the Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey.2 Appeal
was thereupon taken to the Court of Errors and Appeals. Held,
judgment of Supreme Court reversed. Szabo v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
132 N. J. L. 331, 40 A. (2d) 562 (1945).
The Federal Employers' Liability Act does not define the term
"negligence". In cases arising under the statute, the courts, in interpreting the term, have therefore applied the common law definition.3 The Court of Errors and Appeals, in the instant case, reaffirmed
the general common law doctrine that ordinarily, an employer is
under no obligation to provide medical care and treatment to an
employee injured and rendered sick on the job, even though such
disability resulted in the course of the employee's activities and was
due to the negligence of the employer. This principle has been long
rooted in the law and is supported by a long line of decisions. It
in the case of Koviacs v. Edison Portland Cement
was recognized
Company 4 which arose in the State of New Jersey. The court there
determined that in the absence of statute or contract no liability exists
on the part of the employer to supply medical aid or other means of
cure to an employee disabled in the performance of his duties. Such
too, is the common law doctrine in the State of New York. In
Voorhees v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co.,5 the Appellate Division of
the State of New York, Fourth Department, in commenting on the
above mentioned principle, stated that "The rule is a general one
that the employer is not required to provide medical attendance for
his employee, unless he has agreed so to do."
But this principle of law is not without an exception born out
2

131 N. J. L. 238, 36 A. (2d) 8 (1944).

43 (1943);
Bailey, Adm. v. Central Vermont Railway, Inc., 319 U. S. 350, 63 Sup. Ct.
1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444 (1943).
4 3 N. J. Misc. 368, 128 Atl. 542 (1925).
5 129 App. Div. 780, 114 N. Y. Supp. 242 (4th Dep't 1909), aff'd, 198 N. Y.
558 mem., 92 N. E. 1105 mem. (1909).
3 Beamer v. Virginian Ry. Co., 181 Va. 650, 26 S. E. (2d)
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of its severity. It offended our fundamental concepts of humanity
and fair dealing. Its impact upon our code of moral conduct demanded that its rigidity be relaxed. Prompted by these compelling
reasons, the courts have invaded the rule and have circumscribed its
legal effect with an exception. 6 It is this exception which the court,
in the case under review, invoked in aid of the plaintiff. It imposes
upon a master the legal duty to provide medical aid to a servant
stricken in the course of his work and rendered helpless to care for
himself. Such liability exists whether or not the disability resulted
from the negligence of the master. The duty is founded upon humane
instincts. It arises out of strict necessity and expires when the emergency is over.
This was the first occasion for the application of the modification
of the general rule by the courts of the State of New Jersey but
support therefor can be found in cases arising in other jurisdictions,
primarily, in some of the midwestern states. One of the earliest cases
in support of the court's decision is Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v.
McMurray.7 There, a brakeman in the defendant's service crushed
his foot between the wheel of the train on which he was employed
and a rail of the track. The accident demanded immediate surgical
attention. The conductor, the highest agent of the company then
present, employed a surgeon. The court ruled that he had authority
to bind the company by the employment of a physician because of
the emergency since there was a duty owing by the company to
provide such aid to the injured employee. Similarly, the court in
the later case of Carey v. Davis8 adopted this exception as the nucleus of its decision. The facts there closely resembled those of the
instant case. The employee was prostrated by the heat and removed
without any further aid or attention. The master was held liable
for failure to provide medical aid for the injured servant helpless to
care for himself.
The principle invading the general rule is limited in scope. It
only becomes operative where the master knew or had reason to know
of the condition of his servant. If the emergency arose in the presence of the employer or if knowledge can be imputed to him, the law
imposes the duty to act. Knowledge of a superior employee is notice
to the employer, sufficient to charge the latter with liability. The
justice of the limitation is obvious and is sanctioned by legal authority.9
6Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., 262 Mo. 560, 172 S. W. 43, L. R. A.
1915C 789 (1914).
7 98 Ind. 358, 49 Am. Rep. 752 (1884).
8 190 Iowa 720, 180 N. W. 889, 12 A. L. R. 904 (1921).
9 Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. Early, 141 Ind. 73, 91, 40 N. E. 257, 28 L. R. A.
546 (1895); Shaw v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 103 Minn. 8, 114 N. W. 85

(1907).
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Whether complete disability existed and whether the condition
was known to the employer are ultimate questions of fact to be decided by the jury under proper instructions from the court. In
the case under review, there was sufficient evidence adduced at the
trial to establish all the elements necessary to charge the employer
with liability under the exception and the determination of the jury
in the plaintiff's favor on these questions will not be disturbed by an
appellate court.
The decision symbolizes the tendency of the courts to further
social and industrial relationships. It illustrates the elasticity of legal
concepts and rules and indicates an attempt on the part of the courts
to transform into legal duties accepted moral obligations.
G.S.
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ARMED FORCES AND WIFE OPERATING BOARDING
HOUSE.-A proceeding in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus was
brought by Evelyn Walch to determine the custody of her child,
Lorena Mae Walch, four years old. Evelyn Tiffany and Donald
OVERSEAS

IN

Walch were married when they were very young, and although his
parents at first objected because of the extreme youth of the couple,
they accepted the situation and received them on friendly terms. The
child was born a year later. The only home of their own which the
couple established was an apartment which they occupied for a very
short time. They moved back and forth between the home of the
husband's parents and the home of the wife's mother.

Donald *was

a farm boy and Evelyn had been brought up in a small city, and
their tastes as to recreation and the location of a home differed considerably. They parted temporarily in 1942 and Evelyn took the
child first to her mother and then left her with relatives in Pennsylvania while she made a trip to California. In September of that
year the Welfare Department of Pennsylvania instructed the senior
Walches to go to Pennsylvania to get the child from the place where
her mother had left her. In 1943 when Donald was inducted into
the army Evelyn returned to him and accompanied him to various
posts during his training period, leaving the child during this time,
with his parents. When he went overseas she returned to his parents'
home and to her child. Becoming dissastisfied with rural life, in
1944, she left the Walch home and went to Beaver Dams to her
brother who, without having divorced his wife, was living there with
another woman. After five weeks, during which the child was left
in the care of this household, the brother, becoming enraged because
of Evelyn's having stayed overnight in town with her mother, phoned

